~/BugBounty/IDOR/”How I was able to exfiltrate any user’s credit coupons”

3 years ago 143

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Hi guys, I will explain how a simple Verb Tempering led to credit-stealing IDOR via this article.

#whoami: JAI SHARMA | Part Time Open Source Security Researcher

To begin with, I will walk you through the target subdomains.

#target: BugCrowd Private Program

#In-scope: a.redacted.com, b.redacted.com

Subdomain: a.redacted.com, allows authenticated users to create discount Coupons for their individual business stores.

I looked for any loophole while creating the Coupons from a.redacted.com. However, got no luck.

After spending 2–3 hours on the same domain, I decided to move onto the next in-scope subdomain: b.redacted.com. I was doing a basic website crawling without prior user authentication.

Next, I tried to log in to the application with valid user credentials. While crawling the target, I found an interesting preflight API call:

OPTIONS /api/v1/client_info?email=user@web.com&external_id=00000111&customer_token=7ddf32e17a6ac5ce04a8ecbf782ca509&merch_id=60037

Noticed anything? Yes, the user email id was sent via the OPTIONS method, resulting in a plain 204 response. Basically, it was triggered to ensure if the oncoming requests are safe or not.

The next thing I tried, to temper with the OPTIONS verb, I changed it to GET, I got some strange response, which includes everything user: user@web.com has created in a.redacted.com — Credit Coupons, Credit History, Expired Coupons, etc.

At this point, I wanted to see, if by just manipulating the email id, if I can fetch data(from a.redacted.com) of other users.

I was able to pull that off. However, this requires an attacker to know the victim’s email and external_id. This seems doable. However, it was still incomplete.

I observed that the external_id value is an incremental value, which is unique for each unique user.

I found the same API call to be missing any rate limit. Well Okay! What else?

Surprisingly, the same external_id is shared once a password reset request was initiated.

Now all I have to do is, create another test account obtain the victim's email id and external ID(easy enumeration/exposed via password reset functionality). Using the same vulnerable request with tempered OPTIONS to GET Method.

And I can fetch the Coupons created in a.redacted.com by the victim, not only the currently active credit coupons, but also, expired coupons, current balance, and other transaction details.