BOOK THIS SPACE FOR AD
ARTICLE ADcyber-attack which has resulted in the theft of their red-team /
penetration testing tools.The attack campaign is reportedly attributed to a
highly sophisticated actor employing novel techniques to gain
access.Details of tools stolen in this cyber breach are provided below:-
AdPassHunt:- credential stealer tool that hunts Active Directory
credentials.
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Beacon:- used for several goals, such as persistence, execution, privilege
escalation, credential dumping, lateral movement etc.
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Beltalowda:- used for conducting variety of security-oriented checks on
victim machine.
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Rubeus, Fluffy:- used to Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets.
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G2JS:- used for automating Microsoft Windows Script Host (WSH) scripts
weaponization.
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InveighZero:- used for man in middle attack like LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and
SMB Relay.
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KeeFarce:- used for extracting password from memory.
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PuppyHound:- used as data collector.
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SafetyKatz:- used for credential dumping.
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Dtrim:- used as credential dumping, Process injection.
SharpZeroLogon:- used the exploit for the Zero logon vulnerability
(CVE-2020-1472)
NoAmci:- used to bypass AMSI (Windows Antimalware Scan Interface)
detection.
NetAssemblyInject:- used to inject C# .NET assemblies into arbitrary
Windows process.
ImpacketObf:- used for working with network protocols.
In addition to the red-team tools, the leaked list contains payload
exploits leveraging the listed below vulnerabilities:-
CVE-2014-1812:- Privilege escalation in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2,
Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1,
and Windows Server 2012
CVE-2016-0167:- Privilege escalation in Microsoft Windows
CVE-2017-11774: Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Outlook
CVE-2018- 13379:- Pre-authorization Arbitrary File Read in Fortigate SSL
VPN
CVE-2018-15961:- Remote Code Execution in Adobe ColdFusion
CVE-2019-0604:- Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Share point
CVE-2019-0708:- Remote Code Execution in Windows Remote Desktop Services
(RDS)
CVE-2019-11580:- Remote Code Execution in Atlassian Crowd
CVE-2019-19781:- Remote Code Execution in Citrix Application Delivery
Controller and Citrix Gateway
CVE-2019-3398:- Authenticated Remote Code Execution in Confluence
CVE-2019-8394:- Pre-authorization Arbitrary File Upload in ZoHo Manage
Engine Service Desk Plus
CVE-2020-0688:- Remote Code Execution in Microsoft Exchange
CVE-2020-1472:- Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Active Directory
CVE-2018-8581:- Privilege Escalation in Microsoft Exchange Server
CVE-2020-10189:- Remote Code Execution in ZoHo Manage Engine Desktop
Central
Recommendations and Countermeasures
Assess systems against aforementioned vulnerabilities [using vulnerability
scanning and monitoring tools] and apply appropriate patches / upgrade to
recent stable versions.
FireEye also released a repository of signatures/rules designed to detect
the use of these tools across a variety of detection technologies-
including snort YARA, Open IOCs, ClamAV which could be used for assessing
the compromise system[s].
Best practices
Practice good cyber hygiene; backup, update, whitelist applications, limit
privilege, and use multifactor authentication. Routinely audit
configuration and patch management programs
Deploy endpoint security tools on all endpoints; ensure they work and are
up to date. Systems and installed applications being fully patched and
updated
Deploy web and email filters on the network. Configure these devices to
scan for known bad domains, sources, and addresses; block these before
receiving and downloading messages. Scan all emails, attachments, and
downloads both on the host and at the mail gateway with a reputable
antivirus solution
Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned
attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file
header). Block attachments of file types:
[exe|pif|tmp|url|vb|vbe|scr|reg|cer|pst|cmd|com|bat|dll|dat|hlp|hta|js|wsf]
.
Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives,
external drives, CDs, etc.). Ensure to Scan all software downloaded from
the Internet prior to executing.
Monitor network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially
outbound to the internet (e.g., SSH, SMB, RDP).
Restrict execution of PowerShell /WSCRIPT in enterprise environment Ensure
installation and use of latest version of PowerShell, with enhanced logging
enabled. Script block logging, and transcription enabled. Send the
associated logs to a centralized log repository for monitoring and analysis
Enable Exploit Protection [Successor to EMET] that includes several client
side mitigation steps. Detailed configuration steps can be seen in
ft-defender-atp/enable-exploit-protection. Turn on attack surface reduction
rules, including rules that block credential theft, ransomware activity,
and suspicious use of PsExec and WMI.
To address malicious activity initiated through weaponized Office
documents, use rules that block advanced macro activity, executable
content, process creation, and process injection initiated by Office
applications. [To assess the impact of these rules, deploy them in audit
mode.]Turn on AMSI for Office VBA on Office 36
Utilize the Windows Defender Firewall and your network firewall to prevent
RPC and SMB communication among endpoints whenever possible. This limits
lateral movement as well as other attack activities.
References
- -fireeye-red-team-tools.html
- -team-tools
tilized-by-fireeye-red-team-tools