UNC1860 provides Iran-linked APTs with access to Middle Eastern networks

UNC1860 provides Iran-linked APTs with access to Middle Eastern networks

Iran-linked APT group UNC1860 is operating as an initial access facilitator that provides remote access to Middle Eastern Networks.

Mandiant researchers warn that an Iran-linked APT group, tracked as UNC1860, is operating as an initial access facilitator that provides remote access to target networks in the Middle East.

UNC1860 is linked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), the APT specializes in using customized tools and passive backdoors to gain persistent access to high-profile networks. Targets include organizations in the government and telecommunications sectors across the Middle East. UNC1860 shares similar tactics with other Iran-linked threat groups, such as Shrouded Snooper and Storm-0861, which have facilitated destructive operations in Israel and Albania. The experts observed the use of the malware BABYWIPER in Israel in 2022 and the malware ROADSWEEP in Albania in 2022. 

Although Mandiant cannot confirm UNC1860’s involvement in these attacks, the experts observed the use of custom malaew used by the group suggesting a role in providing initial access for such operations. The group is known for maintaining long-term access to victim networks.

“Mandiant identified two custom, GUI-operated malware controllers tracked as TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN that we assess were used to provide a team outside of UNC1860 remote access to victim networks.” Mandiant said. “This tooling, coupled with public reporting and evidence suggesting that the group collaborates with MOIS-affiliated groups such as APT34, strengthens the assessment that UNC1860 acts as an initial access agent.”

Mandiant noticed that organizations compromised by the Iran-linked group APT34 in 2019 and 2020 had also been previously breached by UNC1860, suggesting UNC1860 may support Iranian state-sponsored hackers in performing lateral movement. Additionally, both APT34-related clusters and UNC1860 have recently shifted their focus toward targets based in Iraq.

The UNC1860 APT uses web shells and droppers like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY, to gain initial access to compromised systems. These tools allow attackers to perform hand-off operations. In March 2024, the Israeli National Cyber Directorate identified wiper activity targeting various sectors in Israel, with indicators including STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY, both linked to UNC1860. STAYSHANTE is disguised as Windows server files, controlled by the VIROGREEN framework. SASHEYAWAY enables the execution of passive backdoors like TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, and SPARKLOAD. SASHEYAWAY has a low detection rate

“UNC1860 GUI-operated malware controllers TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN could provide third-party actors who have no previous knowledge of the target environment the ability to remotely access infected networks via RDP and to control previously installed malware on victim networks with ease.” continues the report. “These controllers additionally could provide third-party operators an interface that walks operators through how to deploy custom payloads and perform other operations such as conducting internal scanning and exploitation within the target network.”

TEMPLEPLAY is a .NET-based controller for TEMPLEDOOR, it supports backdoor funcionalitiess, file transfers, and proxy connections to target servers. The UNC1860’s arsenal includes a wide range of passive tools and backdoors supporting initial access, lateral movement, and data gathering.

The implants used by the APT group demonstrate a deep knowledge of the Windows OS, reverse engineering of kernel components, and detection evasion techniques. Their passive implants, such as TOFUDRV and TOFULOAD, do not initiate outbound traffic, instead relying on inbound commands from volatile sources, making detection harder. These implants use HTTPS-encrypted traffic and undocumented Input/Output Control commands to evade network monitoring and endpoint detection. Tools like TEMPLEDROP repurpose Iranian antivirus drivers to protect files, while TEMPLELOCK, a .NET-based utility, terminates and restarts the Windows Event Log service to evade detection.

“These capabilities demonstrate that UNC1860 is a formidable threat actor that likely supports various objectives ranging from espionage to network attack operations.” concludes the report. “As tensions continue to ebb and flow in the Middle East, we believe this actor’s adeptness in gaining initial access to target environments represents a valuable asset for the Iranian cyber ecosystem that can be exploited to answer evolving objectives as needs shift.” 

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Pierluigi Paganini

(SecurityAffairs – hacking, Iran)